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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINCOLN C. WHITE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WESTERN EMPIRE LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, and A. A. 
TIMPSON 
' Defendants and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9156 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced on the 3rd day of February, 
1959, by the plaintiff-respondent, Lincoln C. White, against 
the defendant-appellant, Western Empire Life Insurance Com-
pany, a corporation, and A. A. Timpson, to recover $6,120.00 
claimed to have been suffered as damages because the defendant 
insurance company and A. A. Timpson did not undertake to sell 
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for the respondent certain shares of stock for the sum of $120.00 
per share. This is an appeal pursued by the defendant and 
appellant, Western Empire Life Insurance Company, from a 
judgment made and entered in favor of the respondent and 
against the appellant in the sum of of $6,120.00 and costs 
(R. 119). 
The respondent, the Western Empire Life Insurance Com-
pany, is a corporation organized under the laws of the State 
of Utah as an "Old Line Legal Reserve" insurance company 
for the sole purpose of writing life insurance, health and acci-
dent policies. A. A. Timpson was President of said corporation 
and also acted as a licensed salesman to sell the company's 
securities, which the company was offering to the general 
public at $60.00 per share, the offer being made by an offering 
circular, or prospectus (Exhibit D-5). 
On January 3, 1958, a letter was addresed to the respond-
ent, Lincoln White, on the company's stationery, and signed 
by A. A. Timpson as President (Exhibit P-3) stating that any 
stock that Lincoln White purchased from the Western Empire 
Life Insurance Company at $60.00 a share would be sold after 
April 1, 1958, for $120.00 a share. Mr. White, on December 
31, 1957, purchased 20 shares of appellant's stock, which were 
the property of a salesman, l\1aurice Timpson (Exhibit D-9 
Check Stub 294). Subsequently, on January 3, 1958, he pur-
chased an additional 40 shares. 
It has been the contention of the appellant that A. A. 
Timpson was without authority to make such an agreement 
or issue such a letter (Exhibit P-3) to the respondent, Lincoln 
C. White; and it was and it is the contention of the appellant 
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that appellant, as an insurance company, could not act as a 
broker or purchase its own stock, and that the alleged contract 
by and between A. A. Timpson and the respondent was, and it 
is an illegal contract. 
The court below did not enter judgment in favor of the 
respondent, Lincoln C. White, and against A. A. Timpson, 
the other defendant, but the court did enter judgment in favor 
of the appellant and against A. A. Timpson on appellant's 
cross complaint. 
The record discloses that the plaintiff, Lincoln White, 
collected a 12V2% or $400.00 commission (R. 49) on the shares 
of stock purchased by him (R. 55). The record further dis-
closes that the plaintiff was buying the stock on account of 
friends residing in Coolrado, and received checks in payment 
therefore (R. 61). The record further shows that A. A. Timp, 
son delivered a copy of the circular or prospectus (Exhibit 5) 
to Mr. White when he first contacted him and that the plaintiff 
accepted the prospectus or circular (R. 91). Plaintiff denied, 
however, receiving the same. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT, A. A. TIMPSON, HAD AUTHORITY TO 
BIND THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
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PLAINTIFF DID NOT RECEIVE A COPY OF THE OF-
FERING CIRCULAR OR KNOW THE CONTENTS 
THEREOF. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AL-
LEGED CONTRACT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND THEREFORE VOID. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF PURCHASED 60 SHARES OF STOCK FROM 
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION AND FURTHER 
THAT THE CORPORATION GUARANTEED TO SELL 60 
SHARES OF STOCK FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT, A. A. TIMPSON, HAD AUTHORITY TO 
BIND THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION. 
The Court found that the president of the defendant cor-
poration, A. A. Timpson, had authority to bind the corporation 
by the letter of January 3, 1958 (Exhibit P-3). It is submitted 
that the trial court erred in this finding. 
In order for the Court to hold the corporation liable under 
the alleged contract, the plaintiff had to prove that the presi-
dent, A. A. Timpson, had: 
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1. Express or implied authority to bind the corporation. 
2. Apparent or ostensible authority to bind the corporation. 
3 . .In the event the plaintiff could not show any of the 
above, then he would have to show ratification of the contract 
by the corporation. 
The Court, under its Findings of Fact, number 6 (R. 115) 
found that Mr. Timpson, the president of the corporation, 
had no express authority from the Board of Directors to write, 
sign, or deliver such a letter as Exhibit P-3. The Court did 
find, however, that the making of such a contract was within 
the apparent or implied authority of the president. Such a 
finding is in error. 
Express or Implied Authority 
The plaintiff contends that the letter of A. A. Timpson 
was a guaraneted contract to sell the stock that he had pur-
chased in the defendant corporation, and that under plaintiff's 
theory of the case, the letter was one of guarantee or suretyship 
on behalf of the corporation to pay plaintiff $120.00 per share 
of stock on or after April 1, 1958 (R. 96). 
The testimony and evidence established uncontrovertably 
that there was no express authority granted by the corporation 
to Mr. Timpson to enter into any contract with the plaintiff, 
or anyone, to repurchase stock (R. 115, Finding of Fact No.6). 
The law of agency and authority or corporate officers has 
been thoroughly passed upon by the courts of the United States. 
As stated in the annotation in 34 A.L.R. 2d 290, 291: 
"Under the general rule that an officer of a corpo-
ration has no authority, merely by virtue of this office, 
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in the management of its business-that the president's 
duty is to preside at its meetings, the vice president's 
to do so in the president's absence, the secretary's to 
record the proceedings, the treasurer's to have .custody 
of its funds-a corporation is not liable upon a contract 
of suretyship or guarantee made by an officer, in the 
absence of evidence that the contract with within the 
authority of the officer, as expressly or impliedly con-
ferred upon him by statute, bylaw, or other act or 
acquiescence of its managing body, or was properly 
incidental to business entrusted to him by that body, 
or was within the ostensible authority as established 
by the practice of the company, or was ratified by the 
proper authority." (Emphasis ours). 
The plaintiff offered no proof or evidence whatsoever that 
the defendant, A. A. Timpson, was empowered to enter into 
any contract with the plaintiff, that the by-laws conferred this 
right upon him, or that the board of directors expressly or 
through acquiescence accepted such a contract. In fact, plaintiff 
merely presented the letter signed by Mr. Timpson and rested 
his case. He did not meet his burden of proof. There is no 
evidence, therefore, before the court that the defendant Timp-
son had implied authority to enter into such a contract. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that in 
the absence of evidence of authority a salesman cannot bind his 
principal to a promise to repurchase securities. Leach & Co. 
v. Lierson, 275 U. S. 120, 72 L. Ed. (Adv. 75) 48 S. Ct. 57. 
It is admitted that there are those cases which do hold that 
the corporation is bound by the promise of an agent to re-
purchase or sell securities; however, it is interesting to note 
the observation made by the annotator in 34 A.L.R. 2d 51 '5 
in commenting: 
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"Even the most superficial examination of the authori-
ties reveals that the courts are far more eager to pro-
tect the purchaser of securities than they are to protect 
the purchaser of other personal property. Many of these 
decisions were handed down in the 1930s and con-
cerned stockholders who had never before been in-
volved in stock transactions, and who knew nothing 
of what to reasonably expect would or could be in-
cluded in an agreement for the sale of stock. A reali-
zation of the desperateness of their position relative 
to the position of a stock salesman is implicit in the 
rulings of the courts.'' 
The plaintiff, in this case now before the court, is a person 
well versed in business and in the selling and buying of se-
curities (R. 34, 3 7), and the fact that he required not one 
but three letters of guarantee (Exhibits P-1, 2, 3) shows that 
he was no novice to the business world. 
This case, now before the court, also differs from any other 
case that the writers of this brief have been able to find, due 
to the fact that the agreement guaranteed the buyer a profit 
of $60 per share or a 100% profit within a four-month period. 
Any person who would enter into such an agreement with any-
one has certainly a duty to ascertain what authority such an 
agent making an agreement of that magnitude had. Failure 
to ascertain that authority would estop the purchaser of the 
stock from asserting the claim that he was an innocent pur-
chaser. 
Apparent or Ostensible Authority 
On the subject of apparent or ostensible authority, American 
Jurisprudence states: 
"It is a fundamental and well settled rule that when, 
in the usual course of the business of a corporation} an 
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officer or other agent is held out by the corporation 
or has been permitted to act for it or manage its affairs 
in such a way as to justify third persons who deal with 
him in inferring or assuming that he is doing an act 
or making a contract within the scope of his authority, 
the corporation is bound thereby, even though such 
officer or agent has not the actual authority from the 
<;:orporation to do such an act or make such a contract.'' 
13 Am. Jur. 870, Corporations, 890 
(Emphasis ours). 
The business of the defendant corporation is that of a 
life insurance company, not a stock brokerage house. One of 
the leading cases, Stoneman v. Fox Film Corp., Mass. 4 N.E. 
2d 63, 107 A.L.R. 989, points out the law with regard to activi-
ties of officers of a corporation which are without the scope 
of the corporation's authorized activities. In that case the 
corporatoin was organized to deal in film processing and de-
veloping and to own and lease land in connection therewith. 
The president of the company entered into a contract to buy 
and lease theaters and theater prope·rty. The Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts, in ruling that the corporation was not bound 
by the contract made by the president, stated: 
"The burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant was responsible for the representations upon 
which he relied. He must show that these represen-
tations were either made or ratified by those having 
authority to bind the defendant in these particulars." 
Citing cases. "It is apparent that no actual authority 
or ratification of this nature was shown." 
The court then went on to say: 
"The bylaws of the defendant gave Wiliam Fox, by 
virtue of holding the office of president, which included 
10 
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that of general manager, no implied authority to nego-
tiate for the leasing or acquisition of theaters." 
The bylaws of the Western Empire Life Insurance Com-
pany, Exhibit D-8, in enumerating the duties of the president, 
provide as follows: 
"The president shall exercise the general supervision 
and direction of the affairs of the company. He shall 
preside at all meetings of the stockholders and of the 
board of directors at which he may be present. How-
ever, at his pleasure he may appoint another person 
to preside at any stockholders meeting. 
"He shall, with the secretary, sign all certificates of 
stock and shall also execut~ any contracts or instru-
ments in writing which the board of directors may 
lawfully authorize and direct." 
While it is true that the bylaws permit the president 
powers to carry on the business of the corporation, this does 
not mean that he can do things which are beyond the purposes 
for which the corporation was formed. 
The Stoneman v. Fox case went on to say, in this respect: 
"The president and general manager of such a cor-
poration as the defendant, has no unlimited power but 
is restricted to doing those things which are usual and 
necessary in the ordinary course of the corporate busi-
ness.'' Citing cases. 
American Jurisprudence states in its work on corporations: 
"The strict rule laid down by a number of authorities 
is that the president of a corporation, aside . from his 
duties as presiding officer at director's meetings, has, 
by virtue of his office, no inherent power to act or 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contract for the corporation greater than that of any 
other director. His authority must be derived from the 
corporation or the board of directors or by statute." 
13 Am. Jur. 876, Corporations, 891 
This rule is followed in the State of Utah. The case of 
Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill. Co., 37 U. 349, 108 P. 
1128, 1130, held: 
"Under our statute, therefore, the president, as such, 
of a corporation, has ordinarily only the powers of a 
director, or such as may be directly conferred upon 
him by the Board of Directors." 
The Supreme Court then quoted from 4 Thompson on 
Corporations 4619: 
" 'The board of directors to whom the authority to 
bind the corporation is committed is not the individual 
directors scattered here and there, whose assent to a 
given act may be collected by a diligent canvasser, 
but it is the board sitting and consulting together in a 
body. Individual directors, or any number of them less 
than a quorum, have no authority as directors to bind 
the corporation. And this is equally the rule, although 
the director who assumed to do so may own a majority 
of the shares.' " 
The plaintiff sought to show that Mr. Timpson was a 
principal stockholder of the defendant corporation. Under the 
Utah rule, it is of no consequence. The Massachusetts court 
in the Stoneman case cited above likewise ruled that ownership 
of stock makes no difference. 
"No greater authority can be inferred from the cir· 
cumstances that William Fox held a majority of the 
12 
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voting shares of stock or that he held the power of 
domination of the corporation." Citing cases. 
Stoneman v Fox Film Corp., Mass. 
4 N.E. 2d 63, 107 A.L.R. 989 
The Utah case of Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Mining and Mill-
ing, cited above, further stated, with regard to the powers of 
the president: 
"As we have pointed out, under our statute (Sect. 
324. Comp. Laws 1907, now 16-2-21, Utah Code Anno., 
195 3) the powers of the corporation must be exercised 
by a quorum of the board of directors when assembled 
as a body. The president, therefore, could not make a 
binding contract, nor modify an existing one unless 
authorized to do so by such a quorum." (Emphasis 
ours). 
See also on this subject the Utah case of Copper King 
Mining Company v. Hanson, 52 U. 605, 176 P. 623. 
As under Utah law the president could have no apparent 
authority, did he then have any ostensible authority? As stated 
before, under the plaintiff's theory, this alleged contract is one 
of guaranty. The Michigan case of In Re Union City Milk 
Company, 329 Mich. 506, 46 N.W. 2d 361, 34 A.L.R. 2d 283, 
plainly sets forth the law with regard to guarantees and osten-
sible authority. 
"The ostensible authority of the general manager 
was limited to the conduct of the business for which 
the corporation was formed. 
"Authority to bind the principal by a contract to 
guaranty or suretyship is not ordinarily to be implied 
from the existence of a general agency. In 2 CJS, 
Agency, Sect. 106, p. 1269, it is said: ' ... such a 
13 
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contract is extraordinary and unusual and so not nor-
mally within the powers accruing to an agent by im-
plication however general the character of the agency; 
ordinarily the power exists only if expressly given. 
Consequently a manager, superintendent, or the like, 
of business or property cannot ordinarily bind his prin-
cipa as surety for third persons.' " 
Duty to Ascertain Extent of Agent's Authority 
The plaintiff knew he was dealing with the president of 
the defendant corporation. His testimony was that he, person-
ally, did not know anything about the corporation, who the 
officers were, who the board of directors were, or what the 
financial condition of the company was (R. 35, 36, 37). He 
based his assumption of the status of Mr. Timpson being that 
of president of the corporation upon the information from 
one other individual and Mr. Timpson himself. As Mr. Timpson 
was, therefore, an agent of the corportaion, the plaintiff had 
the legal duty of ascertaining the scope of the president's 
authority if he expected to hold the corporation liable under 
a contract executed by this officer. 
·'The general rule of agency that a person dealing 
with an agent must use reasonable diligence and pru-
dence to ascertain whether the agent acts within the 
scope of his powers, and is therefore presumed to 
know the extent of the agent's authority, is fully ap-
plicable to persons dealing with another as the officer 
or agent of a corporation." 
13 Am. Jur., 872, Corporations, 891 
The plaintiff cannot blindly plunge into a contract with 
an agent or officer and then seek to hold the corporation liable, 
when a phone call or inquiry to the directors of the company 
14 
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would have revealed the extent of the authority of those who 
would bind the corporation. 
"The mere fact that one is dealing with an agent, 
whether the agency be general or special, should be 
a danger signal, and like a railroad crossing suggests 
the duty to 'stop, look and listen', and if he would 
bind the principal he is bound to ascertain not only the 
fact of agency, but the nature and extent of the author-
ity, and in case either is controverted the burden of 
proof is upon him to establish it. In fine, he must exer-
cise due care and caution in the premises." 
Brutinel v. Nygren 
17 Ariz. 491, 154 P. 1042 
The plaintiff, by his own testimony, failed to use prudence 
or caution, but proceeded blindly. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has settled this matter con-
clusively in the case of Aggeller v. Musser Seed Company, 
73 U. 120, 272 P. 933, a case which involved the president of 
a Utah corporation entering into a lease agreement unknown 
to the other officers or directors of a corporation. In that case, 
this Supreme Court said: 
"It does seem that where a party deals with the 
officers of a corporation with which it is wholly un-
~' acquainted, and of the existence of which it is not 
informed, it is not in a position to hold such corporation 
liable for the unauthorized acts of its officers." 
American Jurisprudence states: 
"A person dealing with a known agent is not author-
ized under any circumstances blindly to trust the agent's 
statements as to the extent of his powers; such person 
must not act negligently, but must use reasonable 
15 
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diligence and prudence to ascertain whether the agent 
acts within the scope of his powers." 
2 Am. Jur. 76, Agency, Sect. 95 
Plaintiff's own testimony gives no doubt but what he acted 
with complete negligence in this matter and a complete lack 
of diligence to ascertain the extent of Mr. Timpson's author-
ity (R. 36, 40, 41, 44). 
American Jurisprudence goes on to state in its work on 
agency: 
"It has accordingly been held that a corporation 
authorizing an agent to sell its stock and collect and . 
turn over the money for it is not bound by his agree-
ment to repurchase the stock, as the duty was upon the 
purchaser to acquaint himself with the extent of the 
agent's authority." 
2 Am. Jur. 77, Agency, Sect. 95 
This statement of the law has been sustained in the fol-
lowing jurisdictions and cases Paul Murry v. Standard Pecan 
Company, 309 Ill. 226, 140 N.E. 834; Morse v. Illinois Power 
& L. Co., 294 Ill. App. 498, 14 N.E. 2d 259; Eberlein v. Stock-
yards Mort. & T.Co. , 164 Minn. 323, 204 N.W. 961; Seifert 
v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg., 191 Minn. 362, 254 N.W.273; 
Overton v. First Texas State Ins. Co., Texas, 189 S.W. 514; 
Wright v. Iowa Power & L. Co., 223 Iowa 1192, 274 N.W. 892. 
The Utah rule, based upon the statutes of this state which 
hold that an officer cannot bind the corporation without the 
consent of the board of directors (Lockwitz v. Pine Tree Min. 
& Mil. Co., cited above; Aggeller v. Musser Seed Co., cited 
above), would bring this state into the jurisdictions which hold 
that the officer cannot bind a corporation upon a promise to 
repurchase or resell stock. 
16 
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Ratification 
A corporation, to ratify the acts of an officer who has 
done an act which he was not authorized to do, must meet 
certain requisites. These are: intent to ratify the actions of the 
officer and a knowledge of the material facts. Aggeller v. 
Musser Seed Company, cited ab<:ve. 
The plaintiff introduced no evidence that the corporation 
ever intended to rtaify the contract, and, further, he did not 
show that the corporation knew of the contract or of the ma-
terial facts of the transaction. As there is no evidence to sustain 
any contention of a ratification, this writer feels that no citations 
of authority are necessary. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT RECEIVE A COPY OF THE OF-
FERING CIRCULAR OR KNOW THE CONTENTS 
THEREOF. 
The record shows that the plaintiff is operating a depart-
ment store known as "FAIM" and that it is a million dollar 
institution (R. 3 7). The record further shows that the plaintiff 
sold 40 shares of stock of the defendant corporation to business 
associates in Denver, Colorado (R. 54), who paid for the 
shares by check (R. 54) but later backed out of the deal. In 
fact, the plaintiff admitted that the stock was purchased by 
him for them in the first instance (R. 55) . The plaintiff denied 
any knowledge of the defendant corporation's activities, finan~ 
cial condition, or business. He further denied that he had ever 
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seen the offering circular (Exhibit D-5) or that he knew the 
contents thereof (R. 36, 56). Mr. Timpson testified that Mr. 
White received a copy of the offering circular (Exhibit D-5) 
(R. 91). 
It is inconceivable that any business man would invest 
$3,600.00 without some investigation. The plaintiff's story 
was that he did not even ask whether or not the company was 
selling insurance or whether or not the company was solvent 
or bankrupt or anything else. Such a story is hardly believable 
but when added to the fact that he sold it to business associates 
of his, the story becomes completely unbelievable. 
The court erred in not finding that the plaintiff received the 
offering circular. 
By receiving the offering circular, the plaintiff is estopped 
from denying the contents and the limitations of representa-
tions made by agents contained therein. 
''The general ruie is that one who deals with an 
agent, knowing that he is clothed with a circumscribed 
authority and that his act transcends his powers, cannot 
hold his principal, * * * " 
2 Am. Jur. 80, Agency, Sect. 99 
The offering circular contains the written extent of 
authority of all agents selling stock of the defendant corpo-
ration. 
"No salesman or any other person has been author-
ized to give any information or to make any represen-
tations on behalf of the company other than those con-
tained in the offering circular, and if given or made such 
information must not be relied upon as having been 
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authorized by the corporation or its officers and direc-
tors." 
Offering Circular (Exhibit D-5) 
Western Empire Life Insurance Company 
In Schuster v. North American Hotel Company, ( 1921) 
106 Neb. 672, 184 N.W. 136, 186 N.W. 87, it was held that 
where a contract for the subscription of stock contains the 
provision that "no conditions, agreements or representations," 
other than those printed in the instrument shall bind the com-
pany, the agents of the company, who sell the corporate stock 
and procure the execution of the subscription contract, clearly 
act outside the limits of their ostensible authority when they 
make an oral authority promise, as an additional stipulation 
and obligation of the company, that the company will, upon 
request, accept a return of the stock and repay the consideration, 
with interest; and the fact that the agents acted fraudulently 
in such a case would not fix responsibility upon the company. 
The plaintiff had actual notice of the extent of the author-
ity of the salesman who sold him the stock. This salesman 
being the president of the corporation would not in any way 
alter the actual notice. The burden of ascertaining the scope 
of the authority of the president was still upon the plaintiff. 
In a California case similar to the one now before the 
court, Kilbride v. Moss, ( 1896), 113 Cal. 432, 45 P. 812, a 
director, large stockholder and vice president of a corporation 
agreed orally to purchase back stock if the purchaser wanted. 
The Court said: 
"The corporation from which he purchased the 
shares of capital stock owed him no duty in the premises 
after such purchase was consummated, except the 
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general obligation to him, common with all other 
shareholders, to fairly and impartially conduct the 
business of the company in such a manner as would 
best promote the interests of all concerned. The cor· 
poration simply sold him 6,000 shares of its stock, 
and received payment therefor. This closed the incident 
so far as the company was concerned. It was the 
defendant who entered into the contract with him 
* * * " 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AL-
LEGED CONTRACT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND THEREFORE VOID. 
Under the terms of the letter (Exhibit P-3), the defend-
ant, A. A. Timpson, was to have sold the stock of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that this letter also meant the corporation. 
Plaintiff's theory as announced in open court by his counsel 
was to the effect that this letter was a guaranty to pay $120.00 
per share to the plaintiff for each share of stock he purchased 
from the defendant corporation. Who was to buy the stock or 
who was to sell the stock was immaterial. If the defendants 
could not find a buyer, then they were to buy it themselves. 
This theory makes this a contract not to sell, but one to buy. 
(R. 96). 
The Utah law is clear and specific upon the conditions 
under which a corporation can repurchase its own securities. 
"Purchase or redemption by company of own shares 
of stock-When allowable--Written agreement be-
tween company and shareholder.-A corporation may 
purchase or redeem one or more shares of any and all 
classes of its own capital stock in any of the following 
cases: 
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(a) To collect or compromise, in good faith, a debt, 
claim or controversy with any shareholder. 
(b) From one who, as an employee, other than as 
an officer or director, has purchased the shares from 
the corporation under an agreement reserving to the 
corporation the option to repurchase, or obligating it 
to repurchase the shares; 
(c) Upon the exchange or surrender of such shares 
for other shares in order to carry out provisions of its 
articles authorizing conversion of its shares; 
(d) Upon a merger or consolidation with, or by 
distribution of the assets of, another corporation; 
(e) Pursuant to a written agreement between the 
corporation and a shareholder thereof that upon the 
death of such shareholder the corporation shall pur-
chase, redeem or cancel the shares of stock of the cor-
poration owned by the shareholder, provided the fol-
lowing requirements are met: 
( 1) Within thirty ( 30) days next following the 
execution of said agreement, the following documents 
be filed with the secretary of state. 
(a) A written notice of such agreement, which notice 
shall contain the name of the shareholder, the number 
and classes of shares to be purchased, redeemed or 
cancelled, the date of the agreement and the considera-
tion to be paid by the corporation; 
(b) An affidavit executed by an appropriate cor-
porate officer reciting that there is no reasonable ground 
to believe that the corporation by the performance of 
such agreement will be rendered unable to satisfy its 
debts and liabilities when they fall due and that such 
agreement was not entered into for the purpose nor 
coudl it reasonably have the effect of impairing, de-
feating or delaying the payment of the just debts and 
obligations of the corportaion; 
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( 2) That the consideration to be paid by the cor-
poratiQn for such purchase, redemption or cancellation 
be no greater than the fair value of said stock, which 
shall be presumed to be the amount specified in the 
agreement, in the absence of clear and convincing proof 
to the contrary; and provided further, that nothing in 
this subsection shall be construed to impair the validity 
of any such purchase or redemption meeting the re-
quirements of any other provision of this section; 
(f) In any case where the use of the funds or prop-
erty of a corporation for such purchase or redemption 
would not cause the impairment of that portion of its 
assets acquired as consideration for its shares or that 
portion which has been treated as payment for shares 
allotted as stock dividends." 
16-2-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
The plaintiff offered no evidence and did not contend 
that any of the documents, required by law to be filed with the 
Secretary of State, State of Utah, had been filed or the pro-
visions of the Utah law otherwise complied with to enable 
the corporation to repurchase its own stock. 
The plaintiff offered no evidence as to the financial con-
dition of the corporation as of April 1, 1958, the date of the 
purported repurchase, which would enable the corporation 
to repurchase its own stock in the event that the statute ( 16-2-
16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) had been complied with. 
There was nothing before the court upon which the trial court 
could base a finding that the corporation could repurchase 
its own stock without impairing the capitalization of the 
company. 
The defendant corporation, as a matter of law, could not 
repurchase its own securities. Therefore, any contract which 
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obligates the corporation to do just that is, as a matter of law, 
void. 
"It may therefore be said to be a fundamental prin-
cipal of the law of contracts that a contract must have 
a lawful purpose and that transactions in violation of 
law cannot be made the foundation of a valid contract." 
12 Am. Jur. 643, Contracts, 149 
If this purported contract had been one of sale instead 
of buy, still it would have been unenforceable because of the 
"blue sky laws" of the State of Utah. They hold that only. 
registered dealers and salesmen may sell securities within the 
State of Utah. 61-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
by session laws of 1957. Certain sales are exempted under 
the provisions of 61-1-6. However, none are applicable to the 
facts in the case now before the court. This was not an isolated 
transaction, as seen from the various letters that the plaintiff 
had in his possession. Likewise, the defendant corporation 
could not act as the representative of the plaintiff as, according 
to the plaintiff, the corportaion was obligated to buy the stock 
itself, and one cannot be a principal and an agent at the same 
time. 
The plaintiff knew at the time of the purchase of the stock 
that the defendant corporation had no authority to sell its 
stock for $120.00 per share. Therefore, there was a condition 
precedent to the formation of any contract, that is, approval 
for the sale of stock at $120.00 from the Insurance Commis-
sioner of the State of Utah. 
In the California case of Campbell v. Mulian Merger 
Mines, 295 P. 1040, the court denied recovery to a buyer of 
stock where it was shown that at the time of the sale of the 
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stock, the buyer knew that the seller did not have permission · 
from the securities commission to sell the stock. The court 
reasoned that the buyer was equally guilty of wrongdoing with 
the seller in violating the laws of the state, and therefore 
would not grant him any relief. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
·PLAINTIFF PURCHASED 60 SHARES OF STOCK FROM 
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION AND FURTHER 
THAT THE CORPORATION GUARANTEED TO SELL 60 
SHARES OF STOCK FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
The evidence shows that 20 shares of stock were purchased 
by the plaintiff on December 31, 1957 (Exhibit P-4, certificate 
No. 294). The plaintiff admits that the date on the certificate 
was correct (R. 50). The check issued by the plaintiff for the 
payment of the 20 shares was dated the 31st day of December 
and the bank stamps indicate one cancellation of January 2, 
1958, another one of January 3, 1958, and a paid stamp 
showing a date of January 3, 1958. It is to be noted that 
the check was deposited with the Sugarhouse Branch of the 
Walker Bank and Trust Company. This necessitated the 
check going through the Salt Lake Clearinghouse and then 
to the First Security Bank of Utah, Main at First South Office. 
The "paid" stamp showing the date of January 3rd was affixed 
by the First Security Bank ( 31-1) when it arrived there on 
the 3rd of January after being cleared through the Salt Lake 
Clearing House on the 2nd of January, the earliest stamp ap-
pearing on the check. 
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The evidence further shows that the stock was purchased 
from lvlaurice D. Timpson and not from the defendant cor-
poration (Exhibit D-9, check stub 294) . 
The letter of guarantee on which the plaintiff seeks to rely 
was not dated until the 3rd day of January, 1958, or some three 
days after the sale of the 20 shares of stock. 
As these twenty shares of stock had already been sold 
to the plaintiff prior to the making of the agreement, there 
was no consideration for the making of the agreement and 
therefore as there is no consideration the contract, if there was 
one, fails for the lack of consideration. Further the letter of 
January 3rd specifically states that the offer was limited to 
stock purchased from Western Empire Life Insurance Company 
(Exhibit P-3). As the 20 shares of stock were the property of 
Maurice Timpson, the purchase was not from Western but 
from Timpson. Therefore, the only stock covered by the letter 
of January 3, 1958, Exhibit P-3, are the 40 shares, which are 
represented by stock certificate No. 368, Exhibit P-4. 
The court erred in finding that the letter of January 3, 
1958, Exhibit P-3, signed by A. A. Timpson, covered 60 shares 
of stock and that the guarantee to sell at $120.00 per share was 
applicable to 20 shares of stock sold prior to the date of this 
letter and purchased from Maurice Timpson. 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellant 
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